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Due to the capability of tolerating high error rate and generating more key bits per trial, high-
dimensional quantum key distribution attracts wide interest. Despite great progresses in high-
dimensional quantum key distribution, there are still some gaps between theory and experiment. One
of these is that the security of secret key heavily depends on the number of the emitted signals. So far,
the existing security proofs are only suitable in the case with infinite or unpractically large number
of the emitted signals. Here, by introducing the idea of ”key classification” and developing relevant
techniques based on the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies, we propose a tight finite-key
analysis suitable for generalized high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocols. Benefitting
from our theory, high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocols with finite resources become
experimentally feasible.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), considered as the first
application in quantum information science, can provide
two distant parties Alice and Bob with a string of secret
key bits by the laws of quantum mechanics. Because
of this amazing feature, it has been rapidly developed
in both theory and experiment over last three decades
[1–11]. Among all the proposed QKD protocols, most of
them are based on qubit systems, such as the well-known
BB84 protocol [1]. QKD protocols using qubit systems
are very mature both in theory and experiment, but in
some scenarios, their performances are limited due to the
dimensionality. For instance, each qubit can distribute at
most 1 key bit. As our requirements for protocols perfor-
mance increase, more and more novel protocols have been
proposed. Some of them can tolerate high error rate such
as six-state protocol [12], some of them carry more than
one secret key each signal [13]. Some of these QKD pro-
tocols prepare quantum states in a Hilbert space larger
than 2, while others may prepare and measure quantum
states in 2 or more bases. That is the reason we call them
high-dimensional(HD) QKD.
Since HD-QKD has various advantages, scholars have
made a lot of efforts both in its security proofs and exper-
imental techniques [13–16]. However, the most existing
security proofs [13, 17, 18] are only available under the
assumption that we have infinite resources. In another
word, the two parties Alice and Bob are required to ex-
change arbitrarily large quantum signalsN , which cannot
be achieved by practical equipments. When we remove
the infinite resources assumption, that is, when we con-
sider the finite key issue, serval security proofs [17, 19, 20]
have been proposed for some specific HD-QKD protocols.
Frustratingly, the number of exchanged quantum signals
N is usually too large to be realized. Thus, a more ef-
ficient method to reduce N to an acceptable level is an
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urgent need. Besides, the existing proof [21] for HD-QKD
protocols are not general, e.g. Bob is assumed to make
measurements along only two bases albeit coding states
are qudit systems.
Here, we propose an efficient method to tackle finite
key issues for generalized HD-QKD protocols, i.e. the
dimension of Hilbert space is arbitrary and Bob’s mea-
surement bases can be multiple. The proposed method
can cover the previous proof technique [21] that is only
suitable for two measurements bases. The essential of
our method is introducing the idea of ”key classification”,
which means classifying key bits into different types with
different bit error patterns. Futhermore, applying un-
certainty relation [22] for smooth entropies [23] to each
type and developing relevant theoretical techniques, we
derive a tight bound of secret key rate for HD-QKD in
finite-key scenarios. Compared with previous methods
including de Finetti theorem [24] and post-selection tech-
nique [25], our method leads to more optimistic bound.
Through numerical simulations, we show that, for a va-
riety of HD-QKD protocols, the number of exchanged
quantum states N can be reduced dramatically thanks
to the proposed theory.
RESULTS
Security definition. Before stating our new proof tech-
nique, let us review the security framework [5, 26] that we
are concerned about in this paper. A general QKD proto-
col is executed by two distant parties Alice and Bob. Bob
receives the signals from an insecure quantum channel.
Then Alice and Bob output either a pair of bit strings
SA and SB, or a symbol ⊥ to indicate the abort of the
protocol.
According to the definition of security, a QKD pro-
tocol has to satisfy three criteria called ”correctness”,
”secrecy” and ”robustness”. Owing to the practical
implementation, it is impossible to guarantee SA =
SB. Then a QKD protocol is εcor-correct, if it is εcor-
indistinguishable from a SA = SB protocol. Similarly, a
2protocol is εsec-secret, if
minσE
1
2
||ρAE − UA ⊗ σE || ≤ εsec, (1)
where UA is the fully mixed state of Alice’s system, ρAE
is the composed state of Alice and Eve, and || · || denotes
the trace norm. Finally, a protocol is εrob-robust, if the
probability that the protocol aborts is no bigger than
εrob. In this work, for simplicity, we just consider the
correctness and secrecy of a QKD protocol. Thereby, we
say a QKD protocol is εtot-security, if it is both εcor-
correct and εsec-secret, with εcor + εsec ≤ εtot.
Based on this security definition, we are able to guar-
antee the security when we use our new technique in the
HD-QKD protocols.
Protocol definition. In this work, we take (d+1)-basis
QKD protocols, i.e. the generalization of the six-state
protocol, as the examples to introduce our proof tech-
nique. Below, we present some assumptions of the de-
vices first. On the one side of the insecure quantum
channel, Alice controls her devices to prepare d-level (d is
a prime number in this work) quantum states which we
also call qudits. We recall that there are at most d + 1
mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) in the d-level Hibert
space. Then, Alice randomly chooses one of MUBs and
encode the key bit into its one orthogonal eigen-vector.
After Bob receiving the particle, he is able to randomly
choose one MUB to do projective measurement. In order
to clearly describe the protocols, we list some notations
as follows.
First, we review the definition of ”overlap”. The
overlap of any two measurements is defined as c =
max||√My√Nz||2∞, where {My} and {Nz} are the el-
ements of the positive operator valued measurements
(POVMs) of Y basis and Z basis, respectively. In this
paper, we heavily rely on the fact that the overlap of any
two POVMs of MUB in d-level Hibert space is 1/d.
Second, the prepared states are guaranteed to be d-
level quantum states chosen from d + 1 MUB Xj,k ∈
{X0,1,X1,0, · · · ,X1,k, · · · ,X1,d−1}, where the notions are
analogous to [17]. On the other side of the channel, Bob
controls his devices to measures quantum states in these
d+1 basis. Thus, there exits an equivalent entanglement-
based (EB) protocol according to the model described
above.
Third, under the EB version of protocol, Alice prepares
two entangled quantum states and sends one of them
to Bob in each trial. At measurement, we assume that
Bob is able to delay all the measurements in X0,1-basis
until parameter estimation completed. This assumption
doesn’t affect the final key rate if the measurement statis-
tics is same as the ones of actual devices. According to
[27], the composed quantum states before measurements
have the simple form
ρnAB =
n∑
n00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1
µn00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1ρ
n
n00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1 .
(2)
In this formula, the sum is taken over all
n00, · · · , njk, · · · , nd−1,d−1 satisfying
∑d−1
j,k=0 njk = n
and µn00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1 are some non-negative coef-
ficients. Moreover, there exits a unitary operation pi
on HnAB which permutes the n subsystems, so that
ρnn00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1 can be given by
ρnn00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1 = pi(⊗d−1j,k=0(|Φjk〉 〈Φjk|)⊗njk ).
(3)
In this expression, the generalized Bell basis states
|Φjk〉 =
∑d−1
s=0 ω
sk |s, s+ j〉 (j, k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d − 1} and
ω is the dth root of unity) [17] belong to the composed
Hibert space of Alice and Bob denoted by HAB.
Finally, in practical optical schemes, (d+1)-basis QKD
protocols are often realized by weak coherent light rather
than single-photon source. And this doesn’t meet the
assumption that Alice prepares d-level quantum states.
Inspired by Lim et al.’s work [28], the finite-key analysis
under this case can intuitively be solved by using decoy
states [29–32].
We now define a family of (d+1)-basis QKD protocols,
Φ[n,m, l, εcor, leakEC], where n is the block size with re-
spect to the shifted keys in X0,1-basis, m is the number
of dits used to do parameter estimation with regard to
each basis, l is the secret key length, εcor is the required
correctness, and leakEC is the information leakage in er-
ror correction. The protocol is asymmetric, specifically,
the n shifted keys used for producing final secret keys are
measured in X0,1-basis, the other (d + 1) ∗ m dits used
for parameter estimation are measured in all d+ 1 basis
Therefore, the number of total sifted keys is defined as
N = n+ (d+ 1) ∗m.
The protocol is described in Box 1
3Box 1 Protocol definition.
State Preparation: Alice and Bob repeat the first
four steps the protocol for i = 1, · · · ,M until the con-
dition in the Sifting step is met. Alice chooses a ba-
sis Xi ∈ {X0,1,X1,0, · · · ,X1,k, · · · ,X1,d−1}, where Xj,k
is chosen with probability pj,k respectively. Here we
choose p0,1 = f(n,m) and p1,k = (1 − p0,1)/d that the
function f(n,m) is chosen to minimize the numberM of
exchanged quantum states. Then, Alice chooses a ran-
dom dit ri ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d−1} and prepares the quantum
state corresponding to ri in a basis Xi
Distribution: Alice sends the quantum state over the
insecure channel to Bob.
Measurement: Bob also chooses a basis X˜i ∈
{X0,1,X1,0, · · · ,X1,k, · · · ,X1,d−1} with probability pj,k
respectively. After receiving the state, Bob measures
it in the chosen basis and stores the outcome r˜i ∈
{0, · · · , d− 1}.
Sifting: Alice and Bob broadcast their basis settings
over an classical authenticated channel. We define the
sets X0,1 := {i : Xi = X˜i = X0,1} and X1,k := {i :
Xi = X˜i = X1,k}. The protocol repeats the first four
steps unless |X0,1| ≥ n + m and |X1,k| ≥ m for each
k ∈ {0, · · · , d− 1}.
Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob use n ran-
dom dits from X0,1 to form the code dit strings X
n
0,1
and X¯n0,1, respectively. Then, for m dits from Xj,k ∈
{X0,1,X1,0, · · · ,X1,k, · · · ,X1,d−1}, they compute d types
of statistical parameters q
(t)
j,k :=
1
m
∑
i δ
(t)
j,k where
δ
(t)
j,k =
{
1, r˜i − ri (mod d) = t,
0, r˜i − ri (mod d) 6= t,
and t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , d− 1}. Moreover, these parame-
ters satisfy
∑d−1
t=0 q
(t)
j,k = 1 with the probability of no
error q
(0)
j,k for each basis Xj,k. The protocol aborts if the
probability of error
∑d−1
t=1 q
(t)
j,k for each basis Xj,k is too
high.
Error correction: For those n that pass the parameter
estimation step, an information reconciliation scheme is
applied. This allows Bob to obtain an estimate Xˆn0,1 of
Xn0,1 by Alice sending him leakEC bits of error correction
data. Then, Alice computes a bit string (a hash) of
length
⌈
log2
1
εcor
⌉
by using a random two-universal hash
function to Xn0,1. She sends the choice of function and
the hash to Bob. The protocol aborts if hash(Xˆn0,1) 6=
hash(Xn0,1).
Privacy amplification: If the n dits pass the error
correction, Alice and Bob apply a random two-universal
hash function toXn0,1 and Xˆ
n
0,1 to extract the final secret
l bits (l ∗ logd 2 dits)
Security analysis. We now present our main result
of our paper. It says that the (d+1)-basis protocols
Φ[n,m, l, εcor, leakEC] are both εcor-correct and εsec-
secret, if the length of secret key is calculated accord-
ing to given set of observed values. The correctness is
guaranteed by the error correction step, where a hash
of Alice’s shifted key is compared with the hash of its
estimate of Bob. If the length of secret key l satisfies
l ≤n(log2 d−H(ξ))(1 −Q− µ(ε))
− leakEC − log2
2
ε2secεcor
,
(4)
the protocols Φ[n,m, l, εcor, leakEC ] are εsec-secret. In
this formula, ξ is a d-level probability vector denoted by
ξ = {ξ0, ξ1, · · · , ξt, · · · , ξd−1}, and
ξ0 =
1− d+1
d
(Q+ µ(ε))
1−Q− µ(ε)
ξ1 = · · · = ξd−1 =
1
d(d−1)(Q + µ(ε))
1−Q− µ(ε) ,
(5)
where H(·) denotes the entropy function of d-level prob-
ability vector by H(ξ) =
∑d−1
t=0 −ξt log2 ξt, εsec =
2
√
1− (1 − ε2)d+1 and µ(ε) that accounts for statistical
fluctuation is given by
µ(ε) :=
√
n+m
nm
m+ 1
m
ln
1
ε
. (6)
A sketch of the proof of equation (4) can be found in
methods section and a rigorous proof including a more
general version of the equation (4) can be found in Sup-
plementary Material. When we comes to the asymptotic
case of sufficient large block sizes n, the statistical fluc-
tuation term µ(ε) can be neglected, and thus l satisfies
l ≤ n(log2 d − H(ξ))(1 − Q) − leakEC , as obtained in
previous work [13].
DISCUSSION
In this section, we analyze the behavior of our security
bounds and compare our bounds with previous results by
numerical simulations [17]. For this purpose, we assume
that the quantum channel can be simulated as a gener-
alization of the qubit depolarizing channel which leads
to
q
(0)
j,k = 1−Q q(1)j,k = · · · = q(d−1)j,k =
Q
d− 1 , (7)
for each basis Xj,k. To maximize the expected key rate,
we fix εtot = 10
−10 and assume an error correction leak-
age of leakEC = ζnH2(Q + µ(ε)) where ζ = 1.1 is the
error correction efficiency and H2(·) denotes the binary
entropy function.
In Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we compare our opti-
mal key rates (defined as l/N) with the secret key rates
in [17] of (d+1)-basis QKD protocols featured by d = 2,
d = 3 and d = 17 respectively. As we can see from these
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FIG. 1. The plots show the secret key rate l/N versus sifted
key length N = n+(d+1)∗m for the protocol when dimension
d = 2 (exactly six-state protocol). The solid curves show our
results while the dash-dotted curves show the results given in
Ref.[13]. The horizontal dashed lines represent the asymptotic
rates for error rate Q ∈ {1%, 2.5%, 5%} (from top to bottom).
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FIG. 2. The plots show the secret key rate l/N versus sifted
key length N = n + (d + 1) ∗ m for the protocol when di-
mension d = 3. The solid curves show our results while the
dash-dotted curves show the results given in Ref.[13]. The
horizontal dashed lines represent the asymptotic rates for er-
ror rate Q ∈ {1%, 2.5%, 5%} (from top to bottom).
figures, our results show a significant improvement in the
minimum block size of producing secret key. Moreover,
we can reasonably conjecture that such improvement be-
comes more prominent with d increasing. Similarly to
[21], the improvement is mainly credited to classifying
sifted key with error types yn
q
(t)
0,1
(see Methods) and using
entropic uncertainty relation to estimate smooth min-
entropy.
In conclusion, we have given tight finite-key bounds for
(d+1)-basis QKD protocols against general attacks. Pre-
vious proof techniques cannot effectively tackle multiple
measurements QKD protocols such as six-state protocol
in finite-key region. To solve this problem, we propose a
new proof technique combining a so-called ”key classifi-
cation” idea and entropic uncertainty relation. The ”key
classification” idea states that we can divide the classical-
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FIG. 3. The plots show the secret key rate l/N versus sifted
key length N = n + (d + 1) ∗ m for the protocol when di-
mension d = 17. The solid curves show our results while the
dash-dotted curves show the results given in Ref.[13]. The
horizontal dashed lines represent the asymptotic rates for er-
ror rate Q ∈ {1%, 2.5%, 5%} (from top to bottom).
classical-quantum state ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E
(see Methods) into
different types according to the relevant dit error pat-
terns, and then apply entropic uncertainty relation to
these states respectively. The subtlety of our new proof
technique is that we can flexibly classify ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E
and
construct the corresponding form of entropic uncertainty
relation, which is also the reason that the new proof tech-
nique can cover the old one [21]. Finally, we believe that
our new proof technique can give more tight finite-key
bounds for other high-dimensional QKD protocols such
as tomographic [33, 34] and reference-frame-independent
[35] QKD protocols .
METHODS
Secrecy. Here we briefly discuss our new proof technique
that is applied to establish the secrecy of the (d+1)-
basis protocols Φ[n,m, l, εcor, leakEC ]. We denote the
dit strings of length n by Xn0,1 of Alice’s side and X¯
n
0,1
of Bob’s side respectively, which are used to extract the
final key. Then, after the measurements (based on EB
version), the classical-classical-quantum state of Alice,
Bob and Eve is given by
ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E =
∑
xn0,1x¯
n
0,1
PXn0,1X¯
n
0,1
(xn0,1x¯
n
0,1)
∣∣xn0,1x¯n0,1〉AB
〈
xn0,1x¯
n
0,1
∣∣⊗ ρxn0,1x¯n0,1E ,
(8)
where xn0,1 ∈ Xn0,1 and x¯n0,1 ∈ X¯n0,1 respectively, and
P
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1
(xn0,1x¯
n
0,1) is the probability of joint dit string
xn0,1x¯
n
0,1. According to the Quantum Leftover Hash-
ing lemma [5, 36], the secret key length is directly de-
pended on the lower bound of smooth min-entropy of
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E). Then, we use the uncertainty relation for
smooth entropies [23] with two constructed POVMs to
give a lower bound of H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E). One is no doubt
the X⊗n0,1 , the other one is pi(X
⊗n0
1,0 · · ·X⊗nk1,k · · ·X⊗nd−11,d−1 )
5where
∑d−1
k=0 nk = n. Thus, uncertainty relation is given
by
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E) +H ε˜max(pi(X⊗n01,0 · · ·X⊗nd−11,d−1 )|B)
≥ log2
1
cn
= n log2 d.
(9)
It is not obvious to apply this formula to the state
ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E , to solve this problem, we introduce the idea
of ”classification”. For any joint dit strings xn0,1x¯
n
0,1, we
can find that the ith pair dits occur t (r˜i−ri (mod d) = t)
type change including error (t 6= 0) or no error (t = 0)
happens. According to this feature, we define new dit
strings yn
q
(t)
0,1
∈ Yn
q
(t)
0,1
that are given by
yn
q
(t)
0,1
= x¯n0,1 − xn0,1 (mod d) (10)
where the subtraction is bitwise and ”t” dit occurs nt :=
n ∗ q(t)0,1 times in dit strings ynq(t)0,1 . Then we denote a con-
ditional state by
ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
=
∑
x¯n0,1−xn0,1=yn
q
(t)
0,1
PXn0,1X¯
n
0,1
(xn0,1x¯
n
0,1)
∣∣xn0,1x¯n0,1〉AB
〈
xn0,1x¯
n
0,1
∣∣⊗ ρxn0,1x¯n0,1E ,
(11)
and its corresponding probability by PYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
) which
is a marginal probability distribution P
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1
(xn0,1x¯
n
0,1).
Therefore, ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E
can be rewritten by
ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E
=
∑
yn
q
(t)
0,1
PYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
,
(12)
where we have ”classified” the state ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E ac-
cording to the dit string yn
q
(t)
0,1
. By uncertain rela-
tionship with appropriately constructing the POVM
pi(X⊗n01,0 · · ·X⊗nk1,k · · ·X⊗nd−11,d−1 ), we can obtain an almost
tight bound of smooth min-entropy of ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
.
With the help of subadditivity of min-entropy [37],
we can connect the two smooth min-entropies between
ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and ρ
X
n
0,1X¯
n
0,1E
. Finally, we obtain the
lower bound of min-entropy given by
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E) ≥ n(log2 d−H(ξ))(1 −Q− µ(ε)), (13)
where ε˜ =
√
1− (1− ε2)d+1 and µ(ε) that analogously
to [21] accounts for statistical fluctuation depends on the
security parameter ε˜.
The approach to constructing the POVM
pi(X⊗n01,0 · · ·X⊗nk1,k · · ·X⊗nd−11,d−1 ) and using the subaddi-
tivity of min-entropy can be found in Supplementary
Material.
Due to the Quantum Leftover Hashing lemma [5, 36],
it is possible to extract a ∆-secret key of length l from
Xn0,1, where
∆ = ε˜+
1
2
√
2l−H
ε˜
min(X
n
0,1|E′). (14)
The term E
′
that represents all information Eve obtained
can be decomposed as E
′
= CE, where C is classical
information revealed by Alice and Bob during the error
correction step. For the revealed information C is at most
leakEC − log2 2εcor bits, we use a chain rule for smooth
entropies and then obtain
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E
′
) ≥ H ε˜min(Xn0,1|E)− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
.
(15)
If we choose ε˜ = εsec/2, combining equation (4) and
Quantum Leftover Hashing lemma, we get
∆ ≤ ε˜+ 1
2
√
2l−H
ε˜
min(X
n
0,1|E′) ≤ εsec
2
+
εsec
2
. (16)
Thus, these protocols are εsec-secret.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Here we present the full proof of our main result.
Definition 1. If we exclude a small probability denoted by ε2 event and only consider its mutually exclusive event
that the error rate under X0,1-basis measurement is bounded by Q+ µ, then we can find a probability distribution
QYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
) :=


PYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)
1− ε2 , q
(0)
0,1 ≥ 1−Q− µ,
0, else.
(A.17)
In the above definition, q
(0)
0,1 is the no error term in the probability vector q0,1 = {q
(0)
0,1, · · · , q(t)0,1, · · · , q(d−1)0,1 } with
respect to the X0,1-basis, and the term µ is the function of ε given by [21]
µ(ε) =
√
n+m
nm
m+ 1
m
ln
1
ε
. (A.18)
Thus, we can find that
F (P,Q) =
∑
y
q
(t)
0,1
√
PYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)QYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
) =
√
1− ε2. (A.19)
7Then the purified distance [37] between the distributions is given by P (P,Q) =
√
1− F 2(P,Q) = ε.
Definition 2. We define the ith dit of string y
n
q
(t)
0,1
by si ∈ {0, 1, · · · , d − 1}. According to each dit string
yn
q
(t)
0,1
, we construct a corresponding POVM denoted by Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
, which the sub-POVM of ith subsystem is X1,si ∈
{X1,0,X1,1 · · ·X1,d−1}. If we choose a comfortable permutation operation pi, Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
can also be written as
Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
= pi(X⊗n01,0 · · ·X⊗nt1,t · · ·X⊗nd−11,d−1 ), (A.20)
where nt = n ∗ q(t)0,1 and thus satisfy
∑d−1
t=0 nt = n.
Lemma 3. If Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
are the outcome dit strings after applying Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
to Alice and Bob’s quantum
system respectively, then
H ε¯min(X
n
0,1|E) +H ε¯max(Xn|ynq(t)0,1
∣∣∣X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
) ≥ n log2 d, (A.21)
where smooth min-entropy is for ρXn0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
= TrB(ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
).
Proof. Because the overlap of any two POVMs of MUB in d-level Hibert space is 1/d, the overlap of X⊗n0,1 and
Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
for any yn
q
(t)
0,1
is 1/dn. Owing to uncertainty relationship for smooth entropies [23], we have
H ε¯min(X
n
0,1|E) +H ε¯max(Xn|ynq(t)0,1
∣∣∣B) ≥ n log2 d. (A.22)
Considering the data-processing inequality for smooth max-entropy [37], we have
H ε¯max(X
n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
∣∣∣B) ≤ H ε¯max(Xn|ynq(t)0,1
∣∣∣X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
). (A.23)
Thus, we complete the proof.
Similarly, if choosing a comfortable permutation operation pi corresponding to yn
q
(t)
0,1
, we can rewrite Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and
X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
as
Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
= pi(Xn01,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1)
X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
= pi(X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1),
(A.24)
respectively. For smooth entropies are covariant under unitary operations [37], we have
H ε¯max(X
n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
∣∣∣X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
) = H ε¯max(X
n0
1,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1
∣∣∣X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1). (A.25)
In the following, we focus on bounding H ε¯max(X
n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
∣∣∣X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
) by observed values. Firstly, we note that the
correlation of Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
is discussed when Alice and Bob respectively output dit strings Xn0,1 and X¯
n
0,1
that satisfy yn
q
(t)
0,1
= x¯n0,1 − xn0,1 (mod d). Then we can conceive a gedankenexperiment that, if we already know the
outputs are xn0,1 on Alice’s side and x¯
n
0,1 on Bob’s side under X
⊗n
0,1 -basis measurement, we do the POVM X
n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and
record the output values. Finally, the output values in the gedankenexperiment help us analyze the correlation of
Xn|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
and thus bound H ε¯max(X
n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
∣∣∣X¯n|yn
q
(t)
0,1
). In fact, we can use the actual observed values to
reconstruct the values that we need in the gedankenexperiment up to a failure probability.
For this purpose, we recall that it is sufficient to consider that the quantum states shared by Alice and Bob before
any measurements have the simple form
ρnAB =
n∑
n00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1
µn00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1ρ
n
n00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1 , (A.26)
8where
ρnn00,··· ,njk,··· ,nd−1,d−1 = pi(⊗d−1j,k=0(|Φjk〉 〈Φjk|)⊗njk ). (A.27)
We note that the pair of qudits |Φt,kt−j mod d〉 outcome ”t” type change under measurements of X0,1-basis and ”j”
type change under measurements of X1,k-basis, and we define its corresponding expected value
λt,kt−j mod d :=
1
n
n∑
n00,··· ,nd−1,d−1
µn00,··· ,nd−1,d−1nt,kt−j mod d, (A.28)
Then, we connect the actual observed values with λt,kt−j mod d that
q
(t)
0,1 =
∑
kt−j mod d
λt,kt−j mod d q
(t)
1,k =
∑
t
λt,kt−j mod d, (A.29)
equivalently,
λt,kt−j mod d =
1
d
(
∑
s
q
((s−k)t+j mod d)
1,s + q
(t)
0,1 − 1). (A.30)
Consequently, we can define the ”conditional” values as we need in the gedankenexperiment picture. The values are
given by
ξj|t :=
λt,t2−j mod d
q
(t)
0,1
, (A.31)
which account for the expected probability that a pair of qudits outcome ”j” type change in X1,t-basis under the
condition that this pair of qudits outcome ”t” type change in X0,1-basis.
Definition 4. Here, we consider a probability distribution with respect to the joint dit strings
Xn01,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1 that is denoted by
R
X
n0
1,0···Xnt1,t···X
nd−1
1,d−1X¯
n0
1,0···X¯nt1,t···X¯
nd−1
1,d−1
(xn01,0 · · ·xnt1,t · · ·xnd−11,d−1x¯n01,0 · · · x¯nt1,t · · · x¯nd−11,d−1). (A.32)
For each joint dit strings xn01,0 · · ·xnt1,t · · ·xnd−11,d−1x¯n01,0 · · · x¯nt1,t · · · x¯nd−11,d−1, we can obtain a new dit string by doing subtraction
bitwise, that is,
x¯n01,0 · · · x¯nt1,t · · · x¯nd−11,d−1 − xn01,0 · · ·xnt1,t · · ·xnd−11,d−1 (mod d), (A.33)
where ”j” dit occurs nt∗ξj|t times in the part x¯nt1,t−xnt1,t. Then, we define a marginal probability denoted by RΞj|t(ξj|t)
of R
X
n0
1,0···X
nt
1,t···X
nd−1
1,d−1X¯
n0
1,0···X¯
nt
1,t···X¯
nd−1
1,d−1
(xn01,0 · · ·xnt1,t · · ·xnd−11,d−1x¯n01,0 · · · x¯nt1,t · · · x¯nd−11,d−1). If we exclude a small probability
denoted by 1− (1 − ε2)d event and only consider its mutually exclusive event that the error rate under all X1,t-basis
measurement is bounded by Q+ µ, then we can find a probability distribution
SΞj|t(ξj|t) :=


RΞj|t(ξj|t)
(1− ε2)d , q
(0)
1,t ≥ 1−Q− µ, for all t
0, else,
(A.34)
where q
(0)
1,t is the no error term in the probability vector q1,t = {q
(0)
1,t , · · · , q(t)1,t, · · · , q(d−1)1,t } with respect to each X1,t-
basis. Similarly, we can find that
F (R, S) =
∑
ξj|t
√
RΞj|t(ξj|t)SΞj|t(ξj|t) =
√
(1 − ε2)d. (A.35)
Then the purified distance between the distributions is given by P (R, S) =
√
1− F 2(R, S) =
√
1− (1− ε2)d.
9Lemma 5. We define a probability vector
ξ(u)
0
= {ξ(u)0|0 , ξ
(u)
1|0 , · · · , ξ
(u)
d−1|0}, where ξ
(u)
0|0 =
d(1 −Q− µ) + q(0)0,1 − 1
d ∗ q(0)0,1
and ξ
(u)
1|0 = · · · = ξ
(u)
d−1|0 =
1− ξ(u)0|0
d− 1 , (A.36)
and let ε¯ =
√
1− (1− ε2)d. Then
H ε¯max(X
n0
1,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1
∣∣∣X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1) ≤ n[q(0)0,1H(ξ(u)0 ) + (1− q(0)0,1) log2 d]. (A.37)
Proof. Owing to the definition of smooth max-entropy and the technique introduced in [21], we have
H ε¯max(X
n0
1,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1
∣∣∣X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1)R
≤Hmax(Xn01,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1
∣∣∣X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1)S
≤ log2
ω1|0+···+ωd−1|0≤⌊n0(1−ξ(u)0|t )⌋∑
ω1|0,··· ,ωd−1|0=0
n0!
ω0|0! ω1|0! · · ·ωd−1|0!
×
d−1∏
t=1
∑
ω0|t,··· ,ωd−1|t=0
nt!
ω0|t! · · ·ωd−1|t!
= log2
ω1|0+···+ωd−1|0≤⌊n0(1−ξ(u)0|t )⌋∑
ω1|0,··· ,ωd−1|0=0
n0!
ω0|0! ω1|0! · · ·ωd−1|0!
+
d−1∑
t=1
log2
∑
ω0|t,··· ,ωd−1|t=0
nt!
ω0|t! · · ·ωd−1|t!
≤n[q(0)0,1H(ξ(u)0 ) + (1− q
(0)
0,1) log2 d],
(A.38)
which completes the proof. In above expression,
∑d−1
j=0 ωj|t = nt for each subscript t, besides, we have used the fact
nt = n ∗ q(t)0,1. The last inequality is shown in Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Let
∑d−1
j=0 Ωj = N with Ω0 ≥ N/2, and definite the corresponding probability vector Ω :=
{Ω0/N,Ω1/N, · · · ,Ωd−1/N}. Then
Ω1∑
ω1=0
· · ·
Ωd−1∑
ωd−1=0
N !
ω0! ω1! · · ·ωd−1! ≤ 2
N∗H(Ω), where
d−1∑
j=0
ωj = N. (A.39)
Proof. Combining the facts that
1 = (
d−1∑
j=0
Ωj
N
)N =
∑
ω0,··· ,ωd−1
N !
ω0! · · ·ωd−1! (
Ω0
N
)ω0 · · · (Ωd−1
N
)ωd−1
≥
Ω1∑
ω1=0
· · ·
Ωd−1∑
ωd−1=0
N !
ω0! · · ·ωd−1! (
Ω0
N
)ω0 · · · (Ωd−1
N
)ωd−1 ,
(A.40)
and
(
Ω0
N
)ω0 · · · (Ωd−1
N
)ωd−1 ≥ (Ω0
N
)Ω0 · · · (Ωd−1
N
)Ωd−1 , (A.41)
we obtain
1 ≥ (Ω0
N
)Ω0 · · · (Ωd−1
N
)Ωd−1
Ω1∑
ω1=0
· · ·
Ωd−1∑
ωd−1=0
N !
ω0! · · ·ωd−1!
= 2
∑d−1
j=0 Ωj log2
Ωj
N
Ω1∑
ω1=0
· · ·
Ωd−1∑
ωd−1=0
N !
ω0! · · ·ωd−1!
= 2−N∗H(Ω)
Ω1∑
ω1=0
· · ·
Ωd−1∑
ωd−1=0
N !
ω0! · · ·ωd−1! .
(A.42)
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It remains to prove equation (A.41). We figure that Ω0 ≥ N/2 ≥ Max{Ω1, · · · ,Ωd−1}, thus
Ωω0−Ω00 ≥ (Max{Ω1, · · · ,Ωd−1})
∑d−1
j=1 Ωj−ωj =
d−1∏
j=1
(Max{Ω1, · · · ,Ωd−1})Ωj−ωj ≥
d−1∏
j=1
Ω
Ωj−ωj
j . (A.43)
Equivalently,
∏d−1
j=0 Ω
ωj
j ≥
∏d−1
j=0 Ω
Ωj
j which completes the proof of equation (A.41), and consequently we complete
the full proof of Lemma 6. Moreover, if Ω0/N ≥ ξ(u)0|0 , H(Ω) reaches maximum when Ω1/N = · · · = Ωd−1/N =
1−ξ(u)
0|t
d−1 ,
that is, H(Ω) ≤ H(ξ(u)
0
). Besides, it is not hard to note that
dnt = (1 + · · ·+ 1)nt =
∑
ω0|t,··· ,ωd−1|t=0
nt!
ω0|t! · · ·ωd−1|t!
. (A.44)
Lemma 7. For any normalized density ρ =
∑
i=1 piρi with the constraint
∑
i=1 pi = 1, if there exists a unnormalized
density ρ˜ =
∑
i=1 p˜iρ˜i that satisfy P (pi, p˜i) ≤ ε and MaxiP (ρi, ρ˜i) ≤ ε¯ where P (·, ·) denotes purified distance [37],
then
P (ρ, ρ˜) ≤
√
1− (1 − ε2)(1− ε¯2). (A.45)
Proof. Because of the constraint
∑
i=1 pi = 1, we find that ρi is normalized. According to the definition of the
purified distance, we have
P (ρi, ρ˜i) =
√
1− F¯ 2(ρi, ρ˜i) =
√
1− F 2(ρi, ρ˜i) ≤ ε¯, (A.46)
where F¯ (·, ·) denotes purified fidelity. Owing to the strong concavity of the fidelity, we find that
F (ρ, ρ˜) ≥
∑
i=1
√
pip˜iF (ρi, ρ˜i)
≥
∑
i=1
√
pip˜i
√
1− ε¯2
=
√
1− ε¯2
∑
i=1
√
pip˜i
=
√
1− ε2
√
1− ε¯2.
(A.47)
Thus, we have
P (ρ, ρ˜) =
√
1− F¯ 2(ρi, ρ˜i) ≤
√
1− (1− ε2)(1 − ε¯2), (A.48)
which completes the proof.
Lemma 8. For a normalized density ρAB =
∑
i=1 piρi with the constraint
∑
i=1 pi = 1 and a unnormalized density
ρ˜AB =
∑
i=1 p˜iρ˜i that satisfy P (pi, p˜i) ≤ ε and Hmin(A|B)ρ˜i = H ε¯min(A|B)ρi for each index i, we have
2−H
√
1−(1−ε2)(1−ε¯2)
min (A|B)ρ ≤
∑
i
p˜i2
−Hε¯min(A|B)ρi . (A.49)
Proof. Hmin(A|B)ρ˜i = H ε¯min(A|B)ρi suggest that MaxiP (ρi, ρ˜i) ≤ ε¯. Combining Lemma 7, we have P (ρAB, ρ˜AB) ≤√
1− (1− ε2)(1 − ε¯2). Thus, we obtain
H
√
1−(1−ε2)(1−ε¯2)
min (A|B)ρ ≥ Hmin(A|B)ρ˜. (A.50)
Owing to the subadditivity of min-entropy, we have
2−Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ ≤
∑
i
p˜i2
−Hmin(A|B)ρ˜i . (A.51)
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Consequently,
2−H
√
1−(1−ε2)(1−ε¯2)
min (A|B)ρ ≤ 2−Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ ≤
∑
i
p˜i2
−Hmin(A|B)ρ˜i =
∑
i
p˜i2
−Hε¯min(A|B)ρi . (A.52)
which completes the proof.
Now, all ingredients are ready, we prove our result as follows
Theorem 9. For classical-quantum state ρXn0,1E = TrB(ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E), its smooth min-entropy is bounded by
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E) ≥ n(log2 d−H(ξ))(1 −Q− µ), (A.53)
Proof. For ρXn0,1E =
∑
yn
q
(t)
0,1
PYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)ρXn0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
where ρXn0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
= TrB(ρXn0,1X¯n0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
) and P (P,Q) = ε,
owing to Lemma 8, we have
H
√
1−(1−ε2)(1−ε¯2)
min (X
n
0,1|E)ρXn
0,1
E
≥ − log2
∑
yn
q
(t)
0,1
QYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)2
−Hε¯min(Xn0,1|E)ρXn0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1 . (A.54)
According to Lemma 3, for each ρXn0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
, its smooth min-entropy satisfies
H ε¯min(X
n
0,1|E) ≥ n log2 d−H ε¯max(Xn01,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1
∣∣∣X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1). (A.55)
Combining Lemma 5 and the probability distribution Q where QYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
) = 0 when q
(0)
0,1 ≤ 1−Q− µ, we obtain
H ε¯max(X
n0
1,0 · · ·Xnt1,t · · ·Xnd−11,d−1
∣∣∣X¯n01,0 · · · X¯nt1,t · · · X¯nd−11,d−1)
≤n[q(0)0,1H(ξ(u)0 ) + (1 − q
(0)
0,1) log2 d]
≤n[(1−Q− µ)H(ξ(u)
0
) + (Q+ µ) log2 d]
≤n[(1−Q− µ)H(ξ) + (Q+ µ) log2 d]
(A.56)
where we use the fact that H(ξ(u)
0
) ≤ H(ξ) ≤ log2 d. Combining equation (A.54), (A.55), (A.56) and the fact that√
1− (1− ε2)(1 − ε¯2) =
√
1− (1− ε2)d+1 = ε˜, we finally obtain that
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E)ρXn
0,1
E
≥− log2
∑
yn
q
(t)
0,1
QYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)2
−Hε¯min(Xn0,1|E)ρXn0,1E|yn
q
(t)
0,1
≥− log2
∑
yn
q
(t)
0,1
QYn
q
(t)
0,1
(yn
q
(t)
0,1
)2−n log2 d+n[(1−Q−µ)H(ξ)+(Q+µ) log2 d]
=− log2 2−n log2 d+n[(1−Q−µ)H(ξ)+(Q+µ) log2 d]
=n(log2 d−H(ξ))(1 −Q− µ),
(A.57)
which completes the proof.
Theorem 10. The (d+1)-basis protocols Φ[n,m, l, εcor, leakEC ] using d-level quantum states is εsec-secret for some
εsec > 0 if l satisfies
l ≤ max
ε˜,ε
′
⌊n(log2 d−H(ξ))(1 −Q− µ(ε))− 2 log2
1
2ε′
− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
⌋, (A.58)
where
H(ξ) = −1−
d+1
d
(Q+ µ(ε))
1−Q− µ(ε) log2
1− d+1
d
(Q + µ(ε))
1−Q− µ(ε) − (d− 1)
1
d(d−1)(Q + µ(ε))
1−Q− µ(ε) log2
1
d(d−1)(Q + µ(ε))
1−Q− µ(ε) , (A.59)
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and we optimize over ε > 0 and ε
′
> 0 with constraints
ε˜+ ε
′ ≤ εsec, ε˜ =
√
1− (1− ε2)d+1 and µ(ε) :=
√
n+m
nm
m+ 1
m
ln
1
ε
. (A.60)
Proof. Due to the Quantum Leftover Hashing lemma [5, 36], it is possible to extract a ∆-secret key of length l from
Xn0,1, where
∆ = ε˜+
1
2
√
2l−H
ε˜
min(X
n
0,1|E′). (A.61)
The term E
′
that represents all information Eve obtained can be decomposed as E
′
= CE, where C is classical
information revealed by Alice and Bob during the error correction step. For the revealed information C is at most
leakEC − log2 2εcor bits, we use a chain rule for smooth entropies and then obtain
H ε˜min(X
n
0,1|E
′
) ≥ H ε˜min(Xn0,1|E)− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
. (A.62)
With the lower bound of smooth min-entropy of ρXn0,1E , we consequently get
∆ ≤ ε˜+ 1
2
√
2l−H
ε˜
min(X
n
0,1|E′) ≤ ε˜+ ε′ ≤ εsec. (A.63)
Thus, these protocols are εsec-secret.
